Growing Up in the Shadows of the FCPA:  Chinese Anti-Bribery Laws and International Companies by Jackson, Ashley
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2015
Growing Up in the Shadows of the FCPA: Chinese
Anti-Bribery Laws and International Companies
Ashley Jackson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jackson, Ashley, "Growing Up in the Shadows of the FCPA: Chinese Anti-Bribery Laws and International Companies" (2015). Law
School Student Scholarship. 823.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/823
Jackson--Page 1 of 43 
 
Growing Up in the Shadows of the FCPA: 
Chinese Anti-Bribery Laws and International Companies 
By Ashley Jackson 
II. WHY COMPANIES SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH CHINESE LAWS.............. 9 
A. Chinese Anti-bribery Laws Are Broader in Some Respects than the FCPA................ 9 
1. Chinese Laws Proscribe Commercial Bribery ........................................................ 10 
2. Chinese Laws Contain No Exception for Facilitation Payments  ............................ 15 
B. Chinese Information Rules May Threaten Corporate FCPA Due Diligence ............. 16 
C. Consequences of Violating Chinese Anti-Bribery Laws Can Be Significant ............ 21 
1. Individuals are Likely to be Prosecuted .................................................................. 22 
2. Corporate Entities Can also Suffer Serious Consequences..................................... 26 
D. International Companies Should Expect More Enforcement ..................................... 28 
1. China Needs to do Something About Corruption ................................................... 29 
2. International Companies Make Excellent Targets .................................................. 35 
III. HOW COMPANIES SHOULD BE RESPONDING TO CHINESE LAWS ............ 37 
A. Complying with Chinese Laws................................................................................... 39 
B.    Preparing for Chinese Enforcement ............................................................................ 42 
IV. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 43 
Appendix A: Compliance Gap Chart ...................................................................................... 43 




Something significant happened in anti-bribery enforcement in 2013. A bribery investigation 
began into one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies. “Four Glaxo China Executives 
Held in Criminal Probe,” 1 read an article in a major news outlet. Reports of the Glaxo Smith 
Kline (GSK) investigation2 were followed with announcements that the life sciences industry 
would be subject to enhanced scrutiny.3 UCB announced that it was being investigated. 4 
Authorities visited the local offices of Bayer,5 Novartis, AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, and Sanofi.6 At 
the same time, the government was engaging in a broader crackdown on bribery in the public 
sector with high profile trials.7  
These events rattled international businesses with operations in China—a group already 
accustomed to bribery investigations. Corruption inquiries have become common in the life 
science industry8 and China is notorious for its corruption.9 But even for this seasoned 
                                                 
1 Four Glaxo China Executives Held in Criminal Probe, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-15/glaxo-case-part-of-wider-china-probe-on-drugs-market -daily-
says.html. 
2 The Chinese government accused GSK of paying USD 490 million in bribes to doctors and government 
officials. The bribes were apparently funneled through inflated travel-agency expenses. Id. 
3 Michael Martina, More foreign pharmaceutical firms could be probed in China: Xinhua , REUTERS (July 24, 
2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/us-china-pharmaceutical-idUSBRE96N0EA20130724. 
4Ben Deighton and Ben Hirschler, China widens drug industry probe, visits Belgium’s UCB, REUTERS (July 19, 
2013),  http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/us-gsk-china-ucb-idUSBRE96H0XQ20130719. 
5 Chinese Authorities Probing German Drugmaker Bayer, REUTERS UK EDITION (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us-bayer-china-idUKBRE98C06Y20130913. 
6 Andrew Jack and Patti Walmeir, Eli Lilly drawn into pharmaceutical corruption claims in China, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d011b670-0b11-11e3-bffc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zoZZJZ4t 
7 See e.g., Bo Xilai scandal: Timeline, BBC NEWS CHINA (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-china-17673505. 
8For an explanation of why life science companies are targeted frequently, see Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Keynote Address to the Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory 
and Compliance Congress and Best Practices Forum (Nov. 12, 2009), www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharma 
congress10/breuer_2.pdf , (“nearly every aspect of the approval, manufacture, import, export, pricing, sale, and 
marketing of a drug product in a foreign country will involve a ‘foreign official’”…under the FCPA.”). 
9 See, e.g., David Voreacos, China’s Bribery Culture Poses Risks for Multinationals, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 
21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-21/china-s-bribery-culture-poses-risks-for-
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community, the news was startling because the reports resulted, not from a U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act10 (FCPA) investigation, but rather, from a Chinese investigation of Chinese 
domestic anti-bribery laws.  
For the most part, China’s domestic anti-bribery laws are not new.11 China’s Criminal Law 
has addressed bribery since 1979.12 Administrative law, through the Anti-Unfair Competition 
Law (AUCL), has prohibited bribery since 1993.13 Still these laws have failed to shape the way 
companies operate in China. Enforcement was nearly non-existent. When the Chinese 
government did target bribery, it tended to focus on the officials receiving bribes, letting sources 
of bribes and non-government recipients off the hook.14 Companies referred to the Chinese laws 
as “local laws,”15 a politically correct way of paying lip service to domestic laws in countries 
with high corruption levels and weak or unenforced bribery laws. 
The FCPA, meanwhile, has driven international corporations to adopt policies, procedures, 
training, due diligence, auditing, and other controls intended to battle bribery in operations all 
                                                                                                                                                             
multinationals.html; see also, Didi Kirsten Tatlow, An Investor’s Guide to Buying Influence in China ,  N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/world/asia/25iht-letter25.html. 
10Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq.) [hereinafter FCPA]. 
11 2011 amendment to Article 164 of the Criminal Law, prohibiting Chinese individuals or entities from bribing 
foreign government officials or officials of public international organizations. Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s  Cong., July 6, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980) 
art. 164 (amended 2011), , translated in WEI LUO, THE AMENDED AND ANNOTATED CRIMINAL CODE OF 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH OFFICIAL INTERPRETATIONS (Wei Luo trans., 2d ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter PRC Criminal Law]. 
12 See PRC Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., July 6, 1979 effective Jan. 1, 1980), art. 383-95, art. 163, and art. 164. 
13 See Anti-Unfair Competition Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm.  Nat’l People’s Cong. Sept. 2, 1993, 
effective  Dec. 1, 1993) art. 8., http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=648&CGid=. 
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306. 
14 Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s Crackdown on Commercial Bribery, Corruption in State-Owned Enterprises, and 
the Impact on U.S.-based Multinational Companies Doing Business in China , Testimony during Congressional-
Executive Commission on China roundtable on Corruption in China Today: Consequences for Governance, Human 
Rights, and Commercial Rule of Law (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Roundtable%20-
%20Corruption%20in%20China%20-%20Daniel%20Chow%20Written%20Statement.pdf. 
15 See, e.g., Legal and ethical risks of healthcare businesses in China ,  
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2a174345-49ed-4885-ae07-7bfd797796d3. 
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over the world.16 Since 2004, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) have engaged in dramatic FCPA enforcement efforts.17 In 2013 alone, 
companies paid fines totaling over USD 720 million and twelve individuals were charged.18 The 
corporate fines in 2013 averaged USD 80 million per corporation.19 Its significant extraterritorial 
reach has made the FCPA a concern of any business with a whisper of a connection to the U.S.20 
On one hand the FCPA has served to raise the profile of bribery as a worldwide problem. On 
the other hand, the relative dominance of the FCPA has meant that companies have not spent 
much time ensuring compliance with other bribery laws.  
Most countries now have some form of law against bribery. Some are broader than the 
FCPA. The most prominent other national law has been the UK Bribery Act21 (Bribery Act). 
Because it is the strictest law on paper, it garnered a lot of attention when it passed in 2010.22 
                                                 
16 See, e.g.,  Report to Congress by the Comptroller General: Impact of Foreign Corrupt Pract ices act on U.S. 
Business, U.S. General Accounting Office 10- 12 (March 4, 1981), http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf 
(discussing early impacts of the FCPA), see also, Best Practices for Managing Compliance in China ,  US-CHINA 
BUSINESS COUNCIL 3 (Oct. 2013) , 
http://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%20Compliance%20Report%202013.pdf ,  (reporting that all of 
the thirty companies interviewed agreed that the FCPA is the “guiding document for establishing clear company 
guidelines when conducting international business.”); see also, Non-compliance with U.S. Anticorruption Law: Are 
you losing millions in company value?  ASIAN-MENA COUNSEL, Vol. 10, Iss. 1, 2012, 
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/wolfe_gehring_asiamena_0512.pdf (discussing the way that FCPA 
compliance or lack thereof could affect the value of Asian companies). 
17See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST : CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO BRIBES OF 




20 For a critical discussion of the extraterritorial reach of the FCPA, see Sean Hecker and Margot Laporte, 
Should FCPA “Territorial” Jurisdiction Reach Extraterritorial Proportions? , ABA INTERNATIONAL LAW  NEWS, 
Vol. 42, No.1 (Winter 2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/international_law_news/2013/winter/should_fcpa_territorial_jurisdiction_r
each_extraterritorial_proportions.html.  
21 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents , [hereinafter 
BRIBERY ACT]. 
22 For more on the early buzz around the Bribery Act, see e.g, Richard Wachman and Larry Elliott, Serious 
Fraud Office Promises Crackdown on Firms Offering Bribes Abroad , THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2010), 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/oct/10/serious -fraud-office-bribery-crackdown. 
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Lack of enforcement23  though, has meant that the fledgling law that has yet to significantly 
impact corporate behavior. No other laws have had the teeth or the enforcement drive to capture 
the corporate attention, so the FCPA has remained the dominant anti-bribery law. 
That focus on the FCPA does not mean that companies are unaware of Chinese corruption 
risks. In fact, most executives are keenly aware that Chinese operations pose FCPA bribery 
dangers. 24 Chinese operations have proved problematic under the FCPA. China has been the 
scene of more violations than any other country, save Nigeria.25 Companies doing business in 
China have been under enhanced scrutiny relating to bribery for years.26Avon has been under 
investigation since 2011 for bribery in China.27 Pfizer, IBM, Morgan Stanley, and JPMorgan 
Chase are among the many other companies that have faced highly-publicized FCPA inquiries 
stemming from conduct in China.28  
                                                 
23 For more on the Bribery Act’s early enforcement or lack thereof, as well as predictions on its future, see Neil 
Baker, U.K.’s Bribery Act Fails to Deliver Significant Cases, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://www.complianceweek.com/uks-bribery-act-fails-to-deliver-significant-cases/article/280865/; see also, Kevin 
Roberts, Jarod G.Taylor, & Duncan Grieve, UK Bribery Act Comes to Life, Morrison & Foerster Client Alert (Aug. 
15, 2013) http://www.dwt.com/Chinese-Probe-Into-GSKMedia-Reports-and-Legal-Analysis-07-29-2013/#_ftn7:  
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130815-UK-Bribery-Act.pdf, (The Bribery Act contains some of the 
strictest laws against corruption, but enforcement has been minimal since the act was passed in 2010. No cases have 
been brought against international actors so far. Although guidance revisions have indicated a tougher stance 
towards enforcement, the few cases brought against corporate entities ultimately involved charges under previous 
laws. Still, the SFO has indicated that a number of cases are currently being investigated, and may lead to 
prosecutions in the future.”). 
24 For more information on the China-related FCPA concerns, see generally Daniel Chow, China Under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 573-607, http://wisconsinlawreview.org/wp-content/files/12-
Chow.pdf. 
25 Voreacos, supra at note 9.  
26 See, e.g. Michael Li-Ming Wong, Emily A. Proskine, and Brent E. Jones, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
and Pharma in the Chinese Market, CPB Review, Gibson Dunn Vol. 21 (2010), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications /Documents/Li-MingWongJones-FCPAandPharmainChineseMarket.pdf. 
27 Julie DiMauro, Avon sets aside millions more for FCPA Settlement , FCPA BLOG (Feb. 14, 2914, 3:18 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/2/14/avon-sets-aside-millions-more-for-fcpa-settlement.html#. 
28 Voreacos, supra at note 9. 
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If that was not enough, companies often look to Transparency International (TI),29 for 
information about a country’s corruption risk. TI gives China a Corruption Perceptions Index 
score of 40 out of 100 with 100 being “very clean” and zero being “highly corrupt.”30 Under 
their assessment, China is the 80th worst for corruption perceptions out of 177 countries included 
in the survey.31 In response to the 2012 survey placing China in the same position, Chinese 
citizens posted comments on the internet joking that the Chinese government must have bribed 
TI in order to achieve such a moderately bad ranking.32 TI also publishes a Bribe Payers Index, 
ranking 28 of the world’s largest economies according to the perceived likelihood that 
companies from these countries will pay bribes abroad. China is second only Russia in that 
ranking.33  
Various aspects of China’s political, economic, and cultural environment contribute to 
systemic risk of venality. If power corrupts, China, dominated by one party rule for over sixty 
years, is ripe for corruption. The Chinese government controls not only the political system, but 
also the economy, and many of its most important industries.34 As a result, there is frequent 
interaction between the government and companies.  
                                                 
29 See e.g., Joel Schectman, Transparency International Rankings Still FCPA Workhorse, Wall Street Journal 
(Apr. 22, 2014),  http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/04/22/transparency-international-rankings-still-fcpa-
workhorse/,  (referring to Dow Jones Risk & Compliance survey showing, “ decades -old Transparency International 
Rankings continue to be a leading data source for companies looking to shore up compliance controls in emerging 
markets.”). 
30 For reference, Singapore received an 86, the U.S. received a 73, and Brazil received a 42, Corruption 
Perception Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/#myAnchor1. 
31 Corruption Perception Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT ’L, 
http://www.transparency.org/country#CHN_DataResearch. 
32 David Caragliano, Is China Really the 80th-Most-Corrupt Country on Earth?, THE ATLANTIC  (Dec. 12, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/ is -china-really-the-80th-most-corrupt-country-on-
earth/266172/. 
33 For reference, companies from the Netherlands and Switzerland are seen as least likely to bribe, 
http://www.transparency.org/country#CHN_DataResearch. 
34 For an overview of the relationship between the Chinese government and industry, see Capitalism confined, 
ECONOMIST  (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21528262. 
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Each interaction creates an opportunity for a corrupt official to request or accept bribes. The 
potential for corruption is especially high in highly-regulated fields like life sciences, energy, and 
communications, where interaction with the government is common. In addition, the complicated 
Chinese regulatory structure has meant that corporations must rely on third parties to navigate 
the regulatory environment and to interact with the government on their behalf. The high bribery 
risk posed by third parties is underscored by the fact that ninety percent of FCPA cases involve 
conduct by third parties.35   
To make matters more worse, individuals working in many state-owned or state-controlled 
industries receive paltry sums for their work leading to the expectation that they will supplement 
their income.36 Finally, cultural norms around cultivating personal relationships, giving gifts, and 
providing hospitality have made bribery a ubiquitous part of life in China.37 One author even 
published Chinese Guanxi, described as an “advice book that teaches people how to cultivate 
social connections with dinners, expensive gifts and “red packets,” or cash-filled envelopes.”38 It 
is no shock then that Chinese business operations pose a risk of bribery. 
But while companies are keenly aware of FCPA-related bribery risks in China, they remain 
largely oblivious to Chinese bribery laws.  Chinese laws have not played a meaningful role in 
corporate policies, procedures, or crisis plans. If China’s bribery laws do come up, the discussion 
                                                 
35 See Stephen Clayton, Top Ten Basic of Feign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance for the Small Legal 
Department, Association of Corporate Counsel, http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/SLD-FCPA-
Compliance.cfm. 
36 See, e.g., Kazunori Takada, Bribery serves as life-support for Chinese hospitals, REUTERS (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/23/us-china-hospitals-bribery-idUSBRE96M12Y20130723 
37 Voreacos, supra note 9. 
38 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, An Investor’s Guide to Buying Influence in China ,  N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/world/asia/25iht-letter25.html. 
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often turns to the potential for triggering or impacting a parallel FCPA investigation39  or other 
carbon-copy inquiry.40  It is true that Chinese investigations can alert the DOJ to FCPA 
violations,41 but FCPA investigations are not the only risk.   
Myopic focus on the FCPA and even the potential of the Bribery Act can lead to compliance 
gaps in China that leave international companies and their employees in jeopardy. In the wake of 
the GSK bribery scandal, a growing number of international companies are recognizing this 
reality. In a 2013 survey conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, nearly 
half of the 399 respondents claimed that compliance with local Chinese law is more important 
than compliance with the FCPA or the Bribery Act.42 The number of firms with that opinion had 
doubled since 2012.43 That is a sea change in attitude toward “local Chinese law.” And while it 
might be a stretch to say that compliance with Chinese laws is more important than compliance 
with the FCPA, it is certainly crucial. The GSK investigation and its aftermath should provide a 
much-needed wake-up call for foreign companies with operations in China who remain focused 
exclusively on FCPA-based concerns. It is a good time then, to take stock of Chinese bribery 
laws and their implications for international companies.  
                                                 
39 See e.g., Daniel Chow, The Interplay Between China’s Anti-Bribery Laws and the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 73:5 OH. ST . L. J. 1015, 1019 (2013), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/02/73.5.Chow_.pdf ,  (arguing that MNCs should view 
Chinese commercial bribery cases with gravity because they can trigger parallel FCPA action); See also, Daniel 
C.K. Chow, China’s Crackdown on Commercial Bribery, Corruption in State-Owned Enterprises, and the Impact 
on U.S.-based Multinational Companies Doing Business in China, Oral testimony,  November 21, 2013. 
http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Roundtable%20-
%20Corruption%20in%20China%20-%20Daniel%20Chow%20Written%20Statement.pdf, (concluding that the 
“highest risk is not prosecution under China’s anti-bribery laws for commercial bribery but prosecutions under the 
FCPA, which has much stiffer monetary penalties and also the possibility of imprisonment for U.S. executives 
involved directly or indirectly in the giving of the bribe.”) 
40 See generally, Andrew S. Boutros and T. Markus Funk, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions: A Growing 
Anticorruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World , originally published in U. Chi. Legal F. 2012, at 259, 
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/12_10_Boutros_Funk_Final.pdf. 
41 Chow, supra note 39. 
42 The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai China Business Report  19, 2013-2014, 
http://www.amcham-shanghai.org/ftpuploadfiles/Website/CBR/2013-2014-China-Business-Report.pdf  
43 Id. 
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This paper seeks to underscore why and how Chinese laws should factor more prominently 
into corporate policies and planning. Part II addresses the “why”—why Chinese laws should 
matter to international companies. Chinese laws are broader in some respects than the FCPA. 
Dual compliance with the FCPA due diligence requirements and Chinese laws might be 
problematic. The consequences of violating Chinese laws can be steep. Also, enforcement 
against international companies will likely continue. Part III speaks to the “how”—how 
international companies should be altering their policies and procedures to account for Chinese 
laws. This paper then offers modest prescriptions for how to prevent non-compliance with 
Chinese laws as well as how to prepare for allegations of bribery. 
II. WHY COMPANIES SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH CHINESE LAWS 
There are multiple reasons why foreign companies should be devoting more attention to 
Chinese laws. Section A explains that Chinese anti-bribery laws are broader in some respects 
than the FCPA, creating a potential compliance gap. Section B alerts companies to the possibility 
that their FCPA “best practices” conflict with Chinese laws on collecting information. Section C 
underscores the fact that the consequences for breaking Chinese bribery laws, or even appearing 
to, can be weighty. Section D argues that continued enforcement against international companies 
is likely.  
A. Chinese Anti-bribery Laws Are Broader in Some Respects than the FCPA  
Corporations must realize that compliance with the FCPA will not ensure compliance with 
Chinese laws. Some Chinese bribery laws do focus on official bribery meaning that they overlap 
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with the FCPA.44 But China’s other anti-bribery laws are broader than the FCPA.45Whereas the 
FCPA only targets bribery of foreign officials, Chinese laws proscribe commercial bribery as 
well.46 Additionally, while the FCPA has an exception for “facilitation payments,”47 Chinese law 
does not contain such an exception. 
1. Chinese Laws Proscribe Commercial Bribery  
Many companies are accustomed to thinking about bribery, but they are usually worried 
about the type of bribery that would violate the FCPA—bribery of a government official.48 And 
while bribery of a government official is illegal China, so is commercial bribery, where the party 
receiving the bribe is a private individual or entity.49  Thus, if a supplier pays a kickback to a 
private company manager in return for a lucrative contract, it can violate Chinese law even if 
there are no government personnel involved in the transaction. Or, if the sales group of a foreign 
corporation pays for a lavish trip for employees of a private company in exchange for those 
employees purchasing from them, it would violate Chinese laws, but not the FCPA.  Or, if, as in 
GSK’s case, executives receive financial and sexual kickbacks from third party, non-
government, intermediaries, it would violate Chinese laws on commercial bribery.50 Thus, even 
                                                 
44  Laws that generally overlap with the FCPA include art. 389, 390, and 393 (prohibiting giving bribes to PRC 
officials), art. 391(prohibiting giving bribers to government  organs and  state-owned entities), art. 392 (prohibiting 
the facilitation of bribes), and the 2011 amendment to art. 164 (prohibiting Chinese individuals or entities from 
bribing foreign government officials or officials of public international organizations). 
45 See Appendix A. 
46 Defined as bribery where the party receiving the bribe is a private individual or entity. 
47  FCPA 15 U.S.C. §78dd(B) . 
48 Because the U.S. has taken an expansive view of “government official,” some “commercial bribery” under 
Chinese laws would still be considered official bribery under the FCPA. Still, the FCPA certainly does not apply to 
purely private actors or entities and it does not address recipients of bribes. 
49 PRC Criminal Law, Article 163 and 164  
50 See, e.g.,  Emily Ford, Leo Lewis, & James Dean, Glaxo’s travel agents organized bribes and prostitutes, say 
police, THE TIMES (July 16, 2013), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/health/article3816774.ece. 
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companies that are in full compliance with the FCPA may be non-compliant with Chinese 
laws.51 
While most company policies technically prohibit all forms of bribery, corporate procedures 
and controls are meant to prevent and detect official bribery. For example, heightened due 
diligence requirements are reserved for parties who will be interacting with government officials.  
Also, auditors do not scrutinize records of interactions with private entities. They do not look for 
employees’ kickbacks. As a result, companies face a risk that employees will violate Chinese 
laws around commercial bribery.  
It is important to note that Chinese law is not alone in prohibiting commercial bribery. In 
fact, banning commercial bribery appears to be part of a larger trend. A 2003 European Union 
Council Framework Decision orders all European Union states to proscribe commercial 
bribery.52 The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) signatories must 
“consider” the criminalization of commercial bribery.53 As discussed, the Bribery Act notably 
forbids engaging in commercial bribery.54  Companies stringently complying with the Bribery 
Act would probably be complying with Chinese laws relating to commercial bribery, but the 
Bribery Act has not been very effective yet.  
                                                 
51 See Appendix A 
52 A summary of the act is available at Europa Summaries of EU Legislation, 2003/568/JHA, 
shttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/fight_against_fraud/fight_against_corruption/l33308_en.htm 
53 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Background of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/. 
54 Wachman and Larry Elliott, Serious Fraud Office Promises Crackdown on Firms Offering Bribes Abroad, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/oct/10/serious -fraud-office-bribery -
crackdown. 
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Some U.S. state laws actually prohibit commercial bribery. Such laws can be “federalized” 55 
under the U.S. Travel Act (Travel Act).56 For instance, Control Components, a U.S. company 
was charged under the Travel Act for payments to private entities in addition to being charged 
under the FCPA for illegal payments to foreign government officials.57 Still, generally, 
commercial bribery has received limited attention in the corporate world.58  Without 
enforcement, companies have not had enough incentive to radically alter their company 
procedures. 
If companies need another incentive to tackle commercial bribery though, they have it. Both 
Chinese Criminal Law and administrative law prohibit commercial bribery. Criminal law 
punishes the most serious or “relatively large”59 bribery cases. According to official guidelines, 
“relatively large” involves bribes over RMB 10,000 for individual and RMB 200,000 for 
entities.60 Article 163 of the Criminal Law addresses non-official bribe-takers;61 Article 164 
                                                 
55 See, e.g., Matthew Fowler, Beyond the FCPA: Commercial Bribery, the Travel Act, and Compliance,  FCPA 
Americas Blog (May 14, 2013)  http://fcpamericas.com/english/anti-corruption-compliance/beyond-the-fcpa-
commercial-bribery-the-travel-act-and-compliance/; see also, H.L. Rogers and Ellen Chisham, In FCPA 
Compliance, Don’t forget about the Travel Act , Law 360 (May 09, 2013), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/439533/in-fcpa-compliance-don-t-forget-about-the-travel-act 
56 The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (a). 
57 The 2012 Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf., [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines]. 
58 For one commentator discussing commercial bribery, see supra note 55. 
59 Interpretations on Several Issues Concerning Application of Law for Handling Criminal Cases of Bribe 
Offering (Promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. & Sup. People’s Procuratorate, Dec. 31, 2012 effective Jan. 1, 2013) 
art. 12 (China). 
60  Id. 
61 Article 163 of the PRC CRIMINAL LAW, supra n. 11, provides: 
 
Whoever from the staff of a company or enterprise takes advantage of his office to extort or accept 
illegally property from others and makes profits for others shall, if the amount involved is 
relatively huge, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal 
detention. If the amount involved is huge, the offender shall be sentenced to fixed -term 
imprisonment of not less than five years, and may concurrently be sentenced to confiscation of 
property. 
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addresses non-official bribe-givers.62 Together, Article 163 and Article 164 make it unlawful to 
offer to, or accept money or property from, the staff of a company or enterprise in return for 
illegitimate benefits.63   
Those found to be in violation of these provisions can be imprisoned, fined, or subject to 
property confiscation. In 2010, four employees of Rio Tinto, an Australian company were 
sentenced to prison for 7 to 14 years for taking bribes from Chinese steel mills.64 In 2008, eight 
supervisors of the French supermarket chain, Carrefour, received jail sentences ranging from one 
year to five years. The supervisors’ crime was taking kickbacks from suppliers in violation of 
Article 163.65 
Commercial Bribery is also addressed under administrative law. Article 8 of the AUCL 
prohibits “business operators from paying bribes for the purpose of selling or purchasing foods 
                                                                                                                                                             
Whoever from the staff of a company or enterprise, in the course of economic activities, accepts 
whatever kind of rebate or commission in violation of the state's stipulations, and takes poss ession 
of it, shall be punished according to the provisions of the preceding paragraph. 
62 Article 164 of the PRC CRIMINAL LAW, supra n. 11, reads, in relevant part: 
Whoever offers property to the staff of a company or enterprise in order to make illegal profits 
shall, if the amount involved is relatively huge, be sentenced to fixed -term imprisonment of not 
more than three years or criminal detention. If the amount involved is huge, the offender shall be 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than ten years, and 
concurrently be sentenced to a fine. 
If a unit commits a crime mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the unit shall be sentenced to a 
fine, and persons directly in charge and other persons directly responsible for the crime shall be 
punished according to the provisions of the preceding paragraph. 
 
63 Id. 
64 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 77 
(2012). 
65 Stephanie Wong, Carrefour Employees Jailed for Taking Bribes, China Daily Says. BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 
1, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=auidv3MhHX0E. 
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or services or obtaining other competitive advantages.”66 Offenses falling within the definition of 
criminal law commercial bribery, but falling short of the criminal law threshold of RMB 10,000 
per individual and RMB 100,000 for the entity could be prosecuted under this law. The 
definition of commercial bribery under the AUCL is also broader than under criminal laws. 
Under the AUCL, commercial bribery includes “offering other business parties property or using 
other means to purchase or sell products in a manner that excludes competition.”67 
Administrative fines, under the AUCL, range from RMB 10,000 to RMB 200,000.68 Pepsi 
Guangzhou was investigated in 2009 after the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
found that Pepsi had committed bribery in violation of the AUCL when it gave display fees to 
stores.  Pepsi paid approximately RMB 100,000, most of which was confiscated profit. The 
judicial explanation referred to the language of the AUCL, saying that Pepsi had clearly engaged 
in “bribery…in order to buy or sell products and services.”69 
                                                 
66 Article 8.1 and 8.2 of the AUCL:  
Managers shall not use money or properties or the other methods to bribe to others in order to sell 
or purchase commodities. It shall be guilty of giving bribe if managers give a secret commission to 
the other organisations or individuals without the normal accounting records. It shall be guilty of 
taking bribe, if the organisations or individuals accept the secret discount without normal 
accounting records. 
Managers may offer a discount to the others in public, or may pay commission to the middle man 
in selling or purchasing commodities. However, managers who give discount to the others or pay 
commission to the middle man, or the others who take the discount or commission shall make 
accounting strictly according to the facts. 
67 AUCL, Article 8. 
68 See Spencer S. Griffith & Yuanming Wang, Chinese Anti-Bribery Law: An Overview of the Chinese Laws 
and Their Importance to Foreign Companies Doing Business in China—Part II, METRO. CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 
30, 2010) , http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/12959/chinese-anti-bribery-law-overview-chinese-laws-and-
their-importance-foreign-companies. 
69 PepsiCo under commercial bribery investigation , ENGLISH PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2009) 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90857/90860/6767606.html. 
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At the time, the decision was heavily criticized by businesses and legal groups, making it 
unclear whether actions like Pepsi’s would normally be prosecuted.70 Nonetheless, given the 
current anti-bribery crackdown, the case may actually reflect present enforcement attitudes. If 
nothing else, the Pepsi prosecution provides insight into the breadth with which the AUCL’s 
commercial bribery provisions can be read.  
Together, PRC Criminal Law and the AUCL create significant potential liability beyond the 
scope of the FCPA.  Another aspect of Chinese laws is broader than the FCPA as well. 
2. Chinese Laws Contain No Exception for Facilitation Payments 
The FCPA’s bribery provision makes an exception for facilitating or expediting payments 
made in furtherance of “routine government action,”71 that involve non-discretionary acts.72 
Examples include visa processing, supplying utilities, or providing mail service.73  In contrast to 
the FCPA, under Chinese laws, there are no exceptions for facilitation payments. 
Companies should be informed regarding the difference between U.S. and Chinese laws, but 
it is unlikely that companies are relying on this FCPA exception in crafting their policies and 
procedures. There are no examples of it being used as defense to a bribery charge under the 
FCPA. Moreover, it would be unwise to allow employees to decide whether something is a 
facilitation payment. Finally, in order to comply with the books and records requirement of the 
                                                 
 70 Henry (Litong) Chen, Double Exposure to Legal Risk Under China’s Competition Laws: Comments upon the 
Exclusive Sales Arrangements in China ,  BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS 
http://www.mwechinalaw.com/news/2010/DoubleExposure.pdf. 
71 FCPA 15. U.S.C. §78dd-1(f)(3) (2010). 
72 DOJ Guidance 
73 FCPA 15. U.S.C. §78dd-3 (2010). 
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FCPA, it would then have to be recorded in the company’s records, so then companies would 
have a possible bribe recorded in their books. 
Most companies have correctly adopted zero-tolerance approach to official bribery. The 
companies that do still view the FCPA facilitation exception as a safe harbor, however, should be 
aware that this would not be available as a legal defense under Chinese laws. Companies paying 
what would be considered facilitation expenses under the FCPA could be committing official 
bribery subject to serious penalties.74  
The breadth of Chinese bribery laws naturally gives pause to all companies with a Chinese 
presence.  Corporations have an extra incentive to tackle bribery whether it falls within the 
FCPA or outside the FCPA scope. But, alarmingly, there is the possibility that a primary method 
of avoiding bribery, due diligence, might be threatened by Chinese laws on information sharing. 
While these laws are not bribery laws, per se, they are intricately linked to a company’s ability to 
assess and address bribery risks. Once again companies need to be aware of developments in 
Chinese laws so that they can order their compliance efforts accordingly. 
B. Chinese Information Rules May Threaten Corporate FCPA Due Diligence  
Due diligence is a key pillar of anti-bribery compliance75 whether for retaining a new third 
party, considering a joint venture partner, or evaluating a possible acquisition. For third parties, 
the DOJ has articulated its expectations.  Companies, the enforcement agency says, “should 
understand the qualifications and associations of its third-party partners, including its business 
                                                 
74 Discussed infra, Part.II.C. 
75 See generally, DOJ Guidelines. 
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reputation, and relationship, if any, with foreign officials.”76 Investigation is also expected in 
mergers and acquisitions.77 Thorough due diligence can detect bribery in an acquisition. This can 
allow a company to walk away from potential successor liability arising from the acquisition. 
Alternatively, the purchaser can continue with the acquisition, but account for the compliance 
issues in the price.78 Either way, due diligence is crucial. In joint ventures79  information 
gathering is key since potential partners could be considered government officials or be in 
corrupt relationships with government officials that could put the foreign company in legal peril.  
But as the need for corporate investigations has increased under the FCPA, China has been 
tightening access to business information, creating a catch-22 for companies.  
Two laws attempt to restrict access to this type of material. Passed in 2009, an amendment to 
Article 253 of the Criminal Code bans certain industries from "selling or unlawfully transferring 
personal information."80 Purchasing the information is also illegal.81 The law carries a penalty of 
                                                 
76 DOJ Guidelines 60, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., Simon Montlake, Cat Scammed: How A U.S. Company Blew Half A Billion Dollard in China , 
Forbes (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/s imonmontlake/2013/02/13/cat-scammed-how-a-u-s-
corporation-blew-half-a-billion-in-china/, (recounting Caterpillar’s disastrous takeover of Siwei, a Chinese company 
after inadequate due diligence failed to detect large-scale fraud in the Siwei’s books). Anti-Corruption Due 
Diligence in Cross-Border M&A, Jones Day Commentary (June 2012), 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/c45698ac-f309-43b1-bf0f-
7da7059297ed/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6e28e59c-861f-4302-b087-7f5667706153/Anti-
Corruption%20Due%20Diligence.pdf, (providing other examples of disastrous due diligence failures as well as an 
example of Lockheed Martin walking away from an acquisition after the target failed to address bribery issues 
discovered in Lockheed’s due diligence). 
79 Capitalism confined, ECONOMIST  (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21528262. 
80 PRC Criminal Law art. 253: 
 
Where any staff member of a state organ or an entity in such a field as finance, 
telecommunications, transportation, education or medical treatment, in violation of the state 
provisions, sells or illegally provides personal information on citizens, which is obtained during 
the organ’s or entity’s performance of duties or provision of services, to others shall, if the 
circumstances are serious, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment not more than three years or 
criminal detention, and/or be fined. 
 
81 Id. (Whoever illegally obtains the aforesaid information by stealing or any other means shall, if the 
circumstances are serious, be punished under the preceding paragraph. Where any entity commits either of the 
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up to three years in prison.82 In 2013, the government issued more regulations restricting the 
flow of “personal information."83   
These laws were ostensibly passed to limit identity theft or other scams.84 Certainly, most 
companies would welcome improvements in China’s information protection.  And the actual 
provision is similar to OECD guidelines85 and European Union privacy laws,86 but China is 
different from other countries with strict privacy limitations. In China, there is very little in the 
way of public records or transparency. Also many Chinese citizens have the same names so it is 
difficult to confirm company ownership without identification numbers. In addition, China has a 
far greater risk of corruption than many of other countries with strict privacy laws.87 Finally, in 
addition to these laws’ stated purpose, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they are geared 
toward suppressing access to information about government officials that might embarrass the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).88  
Regardless of the purpose of the restrictions though, the rules have crucial implications for 
corporate due diligence. At the very least, these laws will jeopardize the quality of companies’ 
risk assessments and their ability to combat bribery. At worst, these rules could render 
impossible dual compliance with the FCPA and Chinese laws.  
                                                                                                                                                             
crimes as described in the preceding two paragraphs, it shall be fined, and the direct liable person in charge and 




84 Ana Swanson, China’s Chilling Crackdown on Due Diligence Companies, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/chinas -chilling-crackdown-on-due-diligence-companies/280787/. 
85See generally, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder  Flows of Personal Data, 
updated 2013,  http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf 
86 See, e.g., Protection of Personal Data, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/index_en.htm 
87 TI rankings, supra note 31. 
88 See generally, Part.II.D.  
Jackson--Page 19 of 43 
 
Typical due diligence material is limited or completely unavailable. Access to corporate 
records about company structure or individual hukous is very restricted.89 Government Bureaus 
have been sealing files that record a business’s owners.90  These are often the only way to 
determine the true owners of an entity and “uncover suspicious relationships and transactions.”91 
As is often the case with Chinese laws, these sometimes-vague laws also lend themselves to 
total lack of predictability.  There has been a recent case defining personal information under 
Article 253, but that does not mean that other courts will take that interpretation.  The 
unpredictability is heightened because similar types of information are still being sold.92 
The possible conflict between FCPA due diligence and Chinese laws is visible in the arrest of 
Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng. The two are founders of ChinaWhys.93 The company’s 
website describes its mission as “walking multinationals through the labyrinth of opportunity, 
risk and unfamiliar cultural environment.”94 The website boasts that the group “specializes in 
discreet risk mitigation solutions, consulting and investigation services to corporate clients in 
matters of high sensitivity across Greater China and the Asia Pacific.”95 The two individuals had 
reportedly been doing FCPA-related investigations on behalf of GSK when they were detained 
by Chinese police.96 Police said that they had purchased private identification information.97 A 
                                                 
89 Kathrin Hille, Peter Humphrey case shows effects of China’s tightened privacy laws , FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Aug. 29, 2013) , http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ea96e13e-105a-11e3-99e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zZZpR1gC. 
90James T. Areddy, Jeanne Whalen, and Laurie Burkitt, China Said to Be Holding British Fraud Investigator, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 21, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323829104578619061421848882. 
91 Swanson, supra note 84. 
92 Id. 
93 Jane Perlez, In China, the Dangers of Due Diligence, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/business/global/china-hems-in-private-sleuths-seeking-
fraud.html?pagewanted=2. 
94 ChinaWhys Website, http://www.chinawhys.com/aboutus.htm. 
95 Id. 
96 Perlez, supra note 93. 
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police investigator claimed ChinaWhys had bought and sold details about “personal registrations, 
automobile and home ownership records, family member names and details of cross-border 
travel.”98 While this seems like exactly the type of information that might help companies detect 
bribery, obtaining the information was illegal under Article 253. 
China has charged other business researchers with similar offenses. The government arrested 
a Canadian man after he provided fodder for a negative report about a mining operation.99 In 
2012, four executives of a Dun & Bradstreet China subsidiary were arrested, sentenced to two 
years in jail, and fined between US 800 and US 3,200.100  
These restrictions raise the cost. Investigators might be leery of doing due diligence. Or they 
may choose not to do it anymore. Either way, the information will be difficult to obtain and more 
expensive. In May of 2013, just months before he was arrested, Peter Humphrey penned 
Exploring the Impact of China’s Clampdown on Public Records.101   In that article, he lamented 
the increasing difficulty of conducting adequate due diligence at a time when it is more 
important than ever.102 Humphrey said, "[a]s an anti-fraud worker in China serving purely 
corporate clients on corporate matters or in litigation support, I find this a very dark day for due 
diligence and forensics work."103 The new limits on information collection may mean that more 
                                                                                                                                                             
97 James T. Areddy, China Puts Corporate Sleuths on Notice, WALL ST . J. (Aug.21, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323980604579026422735845320 . 
98 James T. Areddy, Investigator tells Media He Regrets Trafficking in Personal Information , China Real Time 
(Aug. 27, 2013, 11:27 AM), (http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/08/27/investigator-tells-media-he-regrets-
trafficking-in-personal-informat ion/ 
99 Perlez, supra note 93. 




101 Peter Humphrey, Exploring the Impact of China’s clampdown on public records, THE FRAUD EXAMINER 
(May 2013),  http://www.acfe.com/fraud-examiner.aspx?id=4294978054. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
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companies find themselves in this catch-22 where they might be violating Chinese information 
laws when they attempt to detect bribery risks in compliance with the FCPA.104 It is clear that 
this will continue to be something which companies will have to continue to monitor lest they 
run afoul of these broad laws.  
C. Consequences of Violating Chinese Anti-Bribery Laws Can Be Significant 
Sections A and B addressed ways that Chinese laws are broader than or potentially conflict 
with the FCPA.  Those sections focused on Articles 163 and Article 164, part of PRC Criminal 
Law; Article 8 of the AUCL, dealing with commercial bribery; and Article 253 and other 
information access rules that can negatively impact FCPA bribery due diligence. This section, 
Section C, casts a wider net, looking at the possible consequences for international companies for 
violating any of the Chinese laws relating to bribery. This includes then, laws that overlap with 
the FCPA in their prohibition on bribery of officials.105 
Until recently, most of the focus Chinese laws had nothing to do with Chinese laws. Instead, 
it was on the potential that Chinese investigations would trigger a parallel FCPA investigation.106 
Investigations by one country often lead to investigations in other countries.  Under UNCAC, 
“[c]ountries agreed to cooperate with one another in every aspect of the fight against corruption, 
including prevention, investigation, and the prosecution of offenders.”107 Under the Convention, 
                                                 
104 Perlez, supra note 93. 
105 Laws that generally overlap with the FCPA include art. 389, 390, and 393 (prohibiting giving bribes to PRC 
officials), art. 391(prohibiting giving bribers to government  organs and  state-owned entities), art. 392 (prohibiting 
the facilitation of bribes), and the 2011 amendment to art. 164 (prohibiting Chinese individuals or entities from 
bribing foreign government officials or officials of public international organizations). 
106 Chow, supra note 39. 
107United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Background of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ 
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countries are also supposed to “render specific forms of mutual legal assistance…”108 That 
degree of cooperation may be largely aspirational, but parallel investigations are still likely since 
U.S. investigators follow Chinese law enforcement actions very closely.  
It is already well-established that FCPA investigations are significant, but the incessant focus 
on parallel investigations might lead to the perception that there are no meaningful consequences 
for Chinese laws themselves. That is not the case. Chinese penalties can be severe. The fines 
may not be as large as those under the FCPA, but the consequences of violating or being 
investigated for violating Chinese bribery laws can be dire for the individual and the entity. 
1. Individuals are Likely to be Prosecuted 
Under the FCPA, large corporate fines and costly investigations are widely considered the 
most serious outcome. Though on the rise, FCPA actions against individuals have been rare. To 
some, this has undermined the deterrent effect of the FCPA. Chinese law, on the other hand, 
makes it difficult to charge entities,109 making a focus on the individual more likely. For 
example, in the GSK case, Chinese executives will likely be charged, while the company will 
not. 110 Under Chinese laws, individuals can face a range of severe legal and extra legal 
consequences.  
Of the potential consequences, the most serious, albeit an unlikely one for foreign employees, 
is the death penalty. The death penalty is a possibility in bribery cases. Though there is relatively 
little information about China’s use of the death penalty, estimates are shockingly high at several 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 Adam Jourdan, GSK’s Chinese Executives, but not Company, likely to Face Charges in China: Sources, UK 
REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2013),  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/uk-gsk-china-idUKBRE9A307J20131104 
(“quoting Daniel Chow: “ I don’t know of any previous case in which the Chinese government has laid criminal 
charges against a foreign company.”). 
110 Id. 
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thousand a year.111 Despite the lack of transparency around it, it is clear that the government has 
used the death penalty in many official bribery cases. In one case, an executive of China Mobile 
was sentenced to death for accepting bribes from Seimans.112 Another official, Zheng Xiaoyu, 
was executed after he took bribes in exchange for approving medicines, some dangerous, in his 
role as head of the SFDA. 113  
To be clear, there are no examples of employees of international companies being executed 
for bribery. Any use would be greeted with outrage around the world and fear in the foreign 
business community. While execution of corporate personnel is not likely, the fact that it is an 
option should frighten international companies.  
A less severe, but still very frightening prospect is the possibility of a prison sentence in 
China. Prison sentences have been uncommon under FCPA enforcement. One former assistant 
U.S. Attorney argued, “you throw a couple of executives in jail in the U.S.—that’s going to catch 
people’s attention in a much more significant way than a $100 million fine.”114 If that is the case, 
then Chinese laws should grab people’s attention in a significant way.  
Under Chinese law, prison time is likely if the case is a serious one. If the bribery involves 
“official bribery,” the individual could face a lifetime prison sentence.115 Individuals convicted 
of giving commercial bribes could face up to ten years.116 Individuals who receive commercial 
                                                 
111 Margaret K. Lewis, Chapter 5: Legal Systems in China  in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CHINESE 
CRIMINOLOGY 51, at 53 (Liqun Cao, et. al. eds., 2014). 
112 Henry Chen, Pharma bribe probe points to China parallel prosecutions, THE FCPA BLOG (Thursday, July 
11, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/7/11/pharma-bribe-probe-points-to-china-parallel-
prosecutions.html#sthash.OFXv6cz9.dpuf. 
113 Hongming Cheng and David O. Friedrichs, Chapter 19:White-Collar and Corporate Crime in China in THE 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CHINESE CRIMINOLOGY 238, at 242 (Liqun Cao, et. al. eds., 2014). 
114 Melissa Maleske, The impact and continuing evolution of the FCPA, Inside Counsel (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/05/22/the-impact-and-continuing-evolution-of-the-fcpa?page=2. 
115 PRC Criminal Laws Articles 390, 391, 392, and 393. 
116 PRC Criminal Law Article 164 
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bribes face up to fifteen years in prison.117 No employees of international companies want to be 
in a Chinese jail. And yet, it has happened.118   
Related to imprisonment, is the possibility of prolonged detention, possibly incommunicado. 
Extended detention, without formal charges, is a reality in China because law enforcement can 
legally hold people for long periods without making a formal arrest.119  In many cases this means 
they have no access to lawyers or consular officers.120 These types of restrictions have been used 
widely by the Chinese government. The New York Times reported that Peter Humphrey and Yu 
Yingzeng were held for a month without seeing friends and family.121 During the early days of 
the GSK probe, more than 30 employees were placed under house arrest and subject to round the 
clock surveillance.122 
Any lengthy detention is a serious concern. But it carries with it an additional worry: the 
potential for coerced testimonies. Like the U.S. law, Chinese criminal law allows for reduction in 
sentence with “voluntary confession.”123 But mounting a defense under Chinese or other 
countries’ laws could be difficult after confessing while in Chinese custody. After Peter 
Humphrey was paraded on television, face blurred, in an orange jumpsuit, the British Embassy 
                                                 
117 PRC Criminal Law Article 163 
118 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 77 
(2012). 
119 James T. Areddy, Jeanne Whalen,  & Laurie Burkitt, China Said to Be Holding British Fraud  Investigator, 
WALL ST . J. (July 21, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323829104578619061421848882. 
120 Id.  
121 Perlez, supra note 93. 
122 Ron Cai, Jeffrey B. Coopersmith, & Elizabeth Chen, Chinese Probe into GSK-Media Reports and Legal 
Analysis, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP,  http://www.dwt.com/Chinese-Probe-Into-GSKMedia-Reports-and-Legal-
Analysis-07-29-2013/. 
123 Article 164 of the PRC CRIMINAL LAW,  supra note11, reads, in relevant part, “[t]he briber who confesses 
actively his bribery before being prosecuted may be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from 
punishment.”  
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expressed its frustration that Humphrey was “publicly interviewed about the details of his case, 
which is currently under investigation and has yet to come to trial.”124 
China has a rich history of public apologies. During the Cultural Revolution, many Chinese 
were subjected to self-criticisms.125 The practice has continued with the government with recent 
self-criticism sessions.126 The importance of public confessions or apologies has been important 
for foreign businesses and individuals as well. Four GSK senior executives gave full confessions 
to “serious economic crimes” after their arrest.127 GSK’s head of emerging markets, also 
expressed regret for the crimes committed by GSK China employees.128 One commentator refers 
to the corporate “art of the ChinApology,”129 humorously addressing the difficulty navigating the 
major Western laws and the Chinese expectations. 
Oddly, the least severe prospect of Chinese legal penalties is the financial penalty for 
individuals. Fines and confiscation of property, are much lower than U.S. fines. For official 
bribery or that involving commercial bribery, there is no predetermined amount. Penalties for a 
non-criminal offense of commercial bribery range between RMB 10,000 and RMB 200,000. 
Still, most employees would prefer to avoid financial fines.   
 
 
                                                 
124 Perlez, supra at note 
125 Critical Masses, ECONOMIST  (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/china/21587248-party-tries-
rein-officials-campaign-self-crit icis m-critical-masses, (“ Criticism and self-criticism frenzies often degenerated into 
brutal struggle sessions and witch-hunts that destroyed the lives of innocent people and the political careers of many 
competent officials.”). 
126 Id., (“one official admitted he had sat on too many sofas and not enough wooden stools, and raised too many 
goblets but only a few simple teacups.”). 
127 http://www.dwt.com/Chinese-Probe-Into-GSKMedia-Reports-and-Legal-Analysis-07-29-2013/ 
128 Id. 
129 Andrew Hupert, How to Make a ChinApology, CHINA SOLVED (Sep.13, 2013) 
http://chinasolved.com/2013/09/how-to-make-a-chinapology/. 
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2. Corporate Entities Can also Suffer Serious Consequences 
As the section above indicated, charges against entities are relatively rare. When they are 
assigned, fines have been low by FCPA standards. Still, there are many ways that a Chinese 
violation or investigation can negatively impact a company’s operations. 
One extreme possibility is for the government to revoke the company’s business license.130 
This would probably only be possible in the event of significant popular outrage at a product that 
killed or seriously injured someone.  
A more likely consequence of a bribery investigation is negative regulatory attention. This 
can lead to a failure to renew an important regulatory license. For example, in China, the Chinese 
Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) must renew license every five years. Failure to renew a 
license on a major drug product could be devastating to a company’s financial outlook.  
Increased regulatory attention can also lead to other violations being discovered. For 
example, while the GSK investigation started with a bribery inquiry, it quickly turned to 
accusations about price-fixing.131 Other records violations may come to light.  The relationship 
between various types of government scrutiny is illustrated by the fact that the 2009 Pepsi 
investigation for commercial bribery violations followed closely on the heels of a yeast 
contamination issue in its frozen orange juice.132 
Another significant effect of a bribery investigation is a drop in sales. Under the FCPA, 
companies talk about reputation damage, but it seems unlikely that U.S. consumers will stop 
                                                 
130 Jourdan , supra at note 111. 
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shopping at Wal-Mart because it engaged in bribery in Mexico. It might be more likely in China 
where China Central Television frequently makes inflammatory appeals to anti-foreigner 
sentiment.  
 Even more likely, business associates might avoid doing business with the company out of 
fear of getting snared in the probe. This could apply to consumers, middle-men, suppliers, and 
consultants. This was evident after the GSK probe when sales of GSK vaccines and other 
medicines declined after doctors refused to meet with GSK’s sales reps. They were afraid of 
being associated with the probe.133 Sales also dropped after Chinese media accused French 
company, Danone SA of paying bribes to medical staff in return for pushing their formula for 
new mothers.134 
Companies with recognizable brand names and key competitors may find themselves 
especially vulnerable to a decline in customer demand, either through an organized boycott or as 
an effect of third parties avoiding the company representatives and products. This can happen in 
after an FCPA investigation too, but the relationship between the domestic climate in China 
means that it will have a greater impact in China 
 A few months after the investigation began, GSK’s sales had dropped by 61%.135  The 
company’s CEO noted that their China numbers had suffered most where other options were 
                                                 
133 Adam Jourdan, Kaznouri Takada, & Ben Hirschler, Analysis Bribery Scandal dents Big Pharma sales in 
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available.136 For instance, GSK sales slumped on one key drug with AstraZeneca, a competitor, 
offering an alternative option.137 
Disruptions in marketing and sales, management can also result.  GSK has had to change its 
sales model rapidly138 and fire hundreds of people.139 This will have important ramifications for 
GSK in China in coming years. Danon SA was under pressure to make changes in its marketing 
techniques as well.140 These noteworthy consequences for both individuals and entities should 
worry international companies—especially in light of the trend toward greater enforcement of 
Chinese laws.  
D. International Companies Should Expect More Enforcement  
Considering Section C, it is clear that the consequences of violating Chinese laws can be 
dire. But these laws and these penalties have been on the books for years; they were just 
unenforced. These bribery laws are merely in the news now because of a recent uptick in 
enforcement efforts.  
This is not the first time China has promised to crack down on bribery. In the past, China has 
engaged in significant anti-corruption campaigns. Leaders under Mao were concerned with 
corruption, launching various campaigns against it.141 In 1986, the government popularized the 
                                                 
136 Ben Hirschler, Update 2-Bribery Scandal Slashes Glaxo Smith Kline’s Chinese Drug Sales, Reuters 
(October 23, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/gsk-earnings-idUSL5N0ID2J520131023. 
137 Id. 
138 Jonathan D. Rockoff and Hester Plumridge, Drug Firms Curb Ties to Doctors, WALL ST . J. (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304858104579263640414302348 . 
139 Naomi Kresge, Glaxo Said to Fire Workers, Withhold Bonuses in China ,  BLOOMBERG NEWS  (Apr. 4, 2014) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-04/glaxo-said-to-fire-workers-withhold-bonuses-in-china.html. 
140 Adam Jourdan, China Milk Powder Crackdown is Tough Medicine for Doctors, Sales Reps , UK REUTERS 
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/uk-ch ina-milkpowder-idUKBRE99E0ZS20131015. 
141 KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 180 (1995). 
Jackson--Page 29 of 43 
 
slogan “[b]eat the tiger [of corruption] in the year of the tiger.”142 And in 1989, preceding the 
Tiananmen Square event, corruption was a key complaint.143 As with now, leaders claimed that 
the very legitimacy of the CCP was at stake in the corruption issue.144 Clearly those campaigns 
were short-lived. 
Under Xi’s leadership, China made some high profile moves to enforce its bribery laws 
against foreign companies in China. The question for international companies then is whether 
they can expect this recent enforcement to continue. It is impossible to predict exactly what 
China will do. But this paper argues that there are many reasons that the Chinese government 
will continue to focus on international companies. At its core, the government has to do 
something about corruption and international companies are the most convenient targets. 
1. China Needs to do Something About Corruption 
Any discussion about China’s domestic political environment begins with a discussion of 
legitimacy. It is mentioned so frequently it seems cliché, but the legitimacy, or the lack thereof, 
helps frame the enforcement environment around bribery. In short, endemic corruption imperils 
the existence of the CCP. It undermines good governance. It angers Chinese citizens.  
In the past, the CCP was able to maintain tight control over the information about public 
officials. That has changed with the internet and social media. The past several years have seen 
other governments topple when angry citizens use social media to organize themselves. In that 
same time, numerous reports have surfaced pointing to grotesque levels of corruption within the 
CCP.  One report, intended for internal investigation, revealed staggering corruption over a 
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fifteen year period where over ten thousand Chinese officials embezzled or otherwise illegally 
obtained USD 120 billion and fled the county.145 Another news story exposed then-Premier Wen 
Jiabao’s wealth.146  Several news stories shined a light on the wealth amassed by Xi Jinping’s 
family as well.147  
Then came the Bo Xi Lai trial. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes of the trial, 
“[a]s details of the Bo family’s wealth emerged, it also highlighted the degree to which the 
families of top Party officials have been able to parlay access to political power into vast 
personal wealth, information that risks further harming the Party’s already fragile legitimacy.”148  
The CRS also said, “with the role micro-bloggers played in moving events in the Bo saga 
forward, the Bo affair highlighted the challenge the Communist Party faces in controlling 
information and narratives in a social media age.” 
In the wake of these scandals, Chinese citizens flocked to social media to express their 
outrage, speak about their own experiences, or reveal corrupt officials. There was a slew of 
sometimes sordid exposes on lower-level Chinese officials, some involving mistresses with 
Hermes Birkin Bags, inconceivable on a clean-government-bureaucrat budget.149  Xinhua reports 
that 15% of 2013’s whistleblowers were scorned mistresses of corrupt officials. Reporting 
                                                 
145 Leo Lewis, Mistakenly-Released Report Reveals Embarrassing Extent of Chinese Corruption , THE 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-in-
china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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corruption is not just for scorned mistresses. It can come from employees, business associates, 
competitors, or political rivals.150 Competitors might “blow the whistle” not out of moral 
outrage, but in an effort to gain a competitive edge.151 Or, an angry official might attempt to get 
retribution by investigating the company. Regardless of how or why the information gets into the 
public arena, the government is under tremendous pressure to take action. 
President Xi Jinping and many other top officials recognize the danger to CCP rule posed by 
corruption. Xi has spoken relatedly about it.  In one speech, he singled out graft and corruption 
as “pressing problems” that needed to be resolved “urgently.”152  In an address to the Politburo, 
he warned, “a mass of facts tells us that if corruption becomes increasingly serious, it will 
inevitably doom the party and the state.”153 Speaking to the Central Committee in 2012, he 
echoed this cautionary statement again saying, “facts have shown that if corruption becomes 
increasingly severe, it will ultimately lead to the ruin of the Party and the country.”154  
President Xi has presided over the most significant anti-corruption drive in recent history, 
referred to as “[d]rastic medicine.”155 At the time of writing this paper, there is actually timeline 
on the government’s official website for China’s anti-corruption drive.156 When this latest 
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crackdown began, some China-watchers argued that the fight on corruption would be a short 
one.157  But the numbers actually support a meaningful increase in corruption efforts,158 
convincing some of the same skeptics.159 
There is the typical talk about limiting banqueting and banning the distribution of extra 
toiletries.160 But there have also been more high-level corruption charges than any other period 
since the CCP came to power. Unlike previous campaigns, the government has been more likely 
to prosecute senior executives of SOEs as well as mid to high-level officials and business people. 
In fact, Zhou Yongkang is the most powerful Chinese official to be prosecuted during CCP 
rule.161 
Domestic legitimacy is not the only thing at stake. There are also international motivations 
for China to continue to crackdown of bribery, official and commercial. Tackling corruption is 
part of China’s obligations under numerous treaties and agreements. China acceded to the 
UNCAC in 2005. China is a member of the World Trade Organization, an organization that 
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requires that China increase its transparency and anti-corruption efforts. Many other 
memberships also require Chinese action against corruption. 
But while the government does recognize the need for reform, it does not want to draw 
unnecessary attention to official bribery. Prosecuting corrupt officials tends to highlight the 
general corruption of the CCP.  In order to continue to control the flow of information, China’s 
government has waged simultaneous campaign against transparency advocates, and journalists, 
and corporate investigators.162 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the conviction and jailing 
of Xu Zhiyong. Xu had raised official ire by demanding that officials disclose their assets. The 
conviction was based on disturbing the public order, but most believe Xu was targeted because 
of his reform and transparency advocacy.163 
Journalists and other social media reporters have also been targeted. The New York Times 
reporter who investigated Wen Jiabao was unable to get his visa renewed.164 After a report by the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists pointed to wealth of many Chinese elite’s 
families and use of tax havens, censorship seemed obvious. "offshore" and "princeling" - the 
term for the children of senior Chinese leaders - caused the page to go blank on Sina Weiba165 
Responding to a spate of internet exposes, the government criminalized “rumors” on the 
internet—this led to significant drop in corruption exposes.  There have also been changes in the 
law around gathering information reducing the information available about Chinese citizens, 
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corporations, and officials.166 Many perceive them as being intended to stop investigations of the 
sort above.167 
 Too much prosecution of official corruption threatens the stability of the party as 
well. It could paralyze the government, take down too many leaders, or reveal to citizens 
just how corrupt the government really is. Powerful ex-leaders Hu Jintao and Jiang 
Zemin reportedly indicated that Xi’s actions against CCP officials were going too far.168  
The government has said, “[o]nly if there is social stability can reform and development 
continue to proceed.”169A little steady reform is good. Too much, and the system might 
collapse. This fits with the CCP modes operandi. 
While the Communist Party has shown little to no interest in reforms that might 
threaten its rule, for most of the last 30 years it has been undertaking… [reforms] 
…intended to improve China’s governance in ways that might help solidify the 
Party’s hold on power. Recent efforts have focused on ways of increasing the 
legitimacy of the political system by making it more competitive, transparent, and 
participatory, without going so far as to cede the Party’s ultimate control over all 
major decisions.170  
  
Investigating domestic companies carries its own problems since they are often 
well connected with officials. The Economist recently provided this law-enforcement 
anecdote illustrating the relationship between domestic entities and the government: 
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Official investigators pounced. But unable or unwilling to find and jail the actual 
crooks, says an industry source, officials have instead been strong-arming 
innocent shipping firms. These are now being squeezed to under-invoice future 
shipments from Shenzhen, and to claim instead that goods are leaving from other 
ports. Why? Because then the trade figures would show superiors in Beijing that 
the local investigators had “solved” the problem of invoice-faking in Shenzhen. 
When looking for easy targets to fulfil their quotas of corruption-bashing, local 
officials may find it simpler to pick on foreign firms than on local ones that have 
good connections with local or national politicians.171 
 This is not to say that domestic firms haven’t been under scrutiny. In fact, 
numerous SOEs and other private companies have faced bribery probes.172 But there are 
difficulties in tackling domestic companies’ bribery. Unlike targeting officials and 
foreign companies, however, investigating international companies has a lot of 
advantages and few downsides.  
2. International Companies Make Excellent Targets 
International companies do indeed engage in corruption. When they do they  can easily 
be caught in the prosecution of an official.  For example, IBM and Hitachi were both implicated 
as part of a case against a Vice Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Construction.  But 
prosecution of foreign companies is best when the corruption does not embarrass the 
government. It is a way to crack down on bribery, looking tough on corruption, without 
displaying the dirty laundry of party members.  It also has many other advantages. 
 The anti-foreigner language is often very effective domestic tool. During the initial GSK 
scandal, the state-owned media played on nationalist sentiments within China.173 Bribery 
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investigations have also proved a way to address populist demands and consumer dissatisfaction 
with prices.174 A National Health and Family Planning Commission spokesman said, China will 
“resolutely crack down” on commercial bribery in pharmaceut icals. Such action, he claimed, 
raises drug costs and putting a burden on consumers.175 Recently, the government has attacked 
apple, Yum Brands, Walmart, and Volkswagen.176 The Chinese government has launched probes 
of foreign dairy companies in an effort to reduce the high cost of infant formula and additional 
milk products.177 GSK promised to review GSK’s business model and lower drug prices in 
China178 
 Many have also viewed it as part and parcel of China’s protectionist measures. After 
tainted milk killed six infants, foreign companies captured almost 80% of the market share for 
formula. It seemed that the bribery investigations were meant to benefit domestic competitors. 
China also wants to use domestic prosecutions to affect international outcomes with Chinese 
companies. One China-watcher commented, “[b]y flexing regulatory muscle at home [against 
foreign companies], they're aiming to make sure their companies will be taken care of overseas." 
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Chinese regulators want to prevent overseas court rulings and trade decisions that aren't in 
China's favor, he said.179 
Some scholars and commentators have argued persuasively that the recent corruption drive 
will be ineffective without other legal and social reforms.180 That is probably true. Others 
skeptics claim that the recent crackdown on bribery is largely for show,181 or driven by 
political182 or protectionist motivations.183  Even if all those things are true, this paper argues that 
those criticisms should not stop companies from making changes to account for Chinese laws. 
Looking at Chinas domestic environment and the international environment, the Chinese 
government has a lot of incentive to continue to go after foreign company corruption 
III. HOW COMPANIES SHOULD BE RESPONDING TO CHINESE LAWS 
Some companies might decide that the hassles and potential costs of Chinese enforcement 
are too great. For instance many companies said that one concern was that regulatory system was 
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harder on foreign companies.184 Those corporations might decide that China, with slowing 
growth, is not worth it.185 But most companies, even those burned by investigations,186 are 
committed to doing business in China. China has the second largest economy in the world.187 It 
has one of the highest growth rates in the world at an enviable 7.6%.188 It has the world’s largest 
population.189 Many continue to see China is a key market of the future.190 Those many 
international businesses who are committed to staying in China cannot continue with business as 
usual.  
These organizations need to pay more attention to the changing Chinese anti-bribery 
landscape. Then they need to take steps to prevent or deal with possible problems. But even 
those compliance officers who recognize the potential liabilities associated with Chinese laws 
might be unsure of what more they should be doing. In contrast to the FCPA, there is a lot less 
guidance, official or otherwise, to help companies comply with Chinese laws. 
 Commentators will continue to parse the GSK investigation and the current bribery climate, 
offering analysis of China’s enforcement. Companies need to stay abreast of this information and 
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189 U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. and World Population Clock, http://www.census.gov/popclock/. 
190See, e.g., Andrew Ward, GlaxoSmithKline sticks with bet on emerging markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 5, 
2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0846f824-8e53-11e3-98c6-00144feab7de.html#axzz30DI0qxRL, (noting that 
GSK has looked to emerging markets like China’s to make up for ebbing sales in other major developed markets). 
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make necessary changes.  But considering the possible consequences of violations,191 there are 
several steps companies should be taking now. Section A will discuss the obvious ways 
companies should adapt to comply with Chinese law. Section B offers some suggestions of steps 
companies should take to prepare for a bribery-law violation in China.  
A. Complying with Chinese Laws 
First, Companies need to adjust policies and procedures to reflect the areas where Chinese 
laws are broader than the FCPA.192 This means the company needs to prohibit all bribery—not 
just bribery of officials.  
Companies should revamp their international policies to explicitly forbid commercial 
bribery. Considering the trend toward addressing commercial bribery, it makes sense for 
companies to make this change worldwide.193 At the very least, however, address it in China 
through a China-specific procedure. After prohibiting commercial bribery, companies need to 
draw attention to the prohibition since current procedures might technically prohibit it, but not be 
targeted prevent it. Training materials should then offer clear definitions and examples of 
prohibited commercial bribery. Employees need to accurately record expenses related to private 
entities and official. Then the company needs to explain the severe possible consequences 
employees that engage in bribery in China—both within the company and without. Companies 
also need to reinforce the total ban on facilitation payments as well.194 
Both these changes need to be communicated to third party suppliers and consultants. Those 
third parties should be trained as well. Contracts should contain clear language prohibiting 
                                                 
191 Discussed supra, Part II.C. 
192 Discussed supra, Part II.A. 
193 Discussed supra, Part II.A.1. 
194 Discussed supra, Part II.A.2 
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bribery of any entities, official or private.195 As usual, the contract should also include language 
allowing the company to audit the third party records if needed and warning the third party that 
the contract will be terminated if bribery violations occur.  
 Then companies need to audit well. Internal and external controls should be geared toward 
detecting all kinds of bribery, not just official bribery. Regardless of why they were retained, 
companies need to then evaluate interactions with similar scrutiny. 
Second, companies need to follow will be China’s laws and practices regarding information 
access. Due diligence remains imperative under both the FCPA and Chinese laws. But as         
Part II.B tells us, risk assessments for future employees, third party suppliers and consultants, 
and potential partners might get companies and their information providers into trouble as well. 
This will mean companies will need to walk a fine line, continuing to emulate best practices 
while carefully complying with Chinese laws. They will need to insure that the entities doing  the 
investigations are not subjecting the company to risk. 
More generally, companies need to take the same kind of action they are supposed to be 
taking under the FCPA, but they need to do it better than they have been in China.  It is always 
important to valuate country-, industry-, and company-specific risks. This includes tailored 
oversight of Chinese operations.   Companies need to keep abreast of common schemes and audit 
for them. GSK apparently failed to detect the large sums being funneled illicitly to doctors 
through travel agencies. Some have questioned why Price Waterhouse Cooper, GSK’s external 
                                                 
195 See note 36, supra, (discussing third parties) See Stephen Clayton, Top Ten Basic of Feign Corrupt Practices 
Act Compliance for the Small Legal Department , Association of Corporate Counsel, 
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/SLD-FCPA-Compliance.cfm. 
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auditor did not detect the travel agency scheme.196 Travel agencies have been a common conduit 
for bribes; it has been used before at IMB in China.197 Chinese counsel can help evaluate what 
types of things internal and external audit should be examining. 
On that note, companies may consider a change in sales and marketing programs. 
Commentators often credit sales pressures credited incentive for sales personnel to bribe.198  
Recognizing this, GSK announced that it would no longer tie employee compensation to the 
number of prescriptions doctors write.199 In December of 2013 GSK announced that it would 
stop paying doctors commissions to prescribe drugs.200 They are also getting rid of prescriptions 
targets for marketing, presumably to reduce incentive for corruption.201 Though they denied that 
it was related to the Chinese bribery investigation,202 the connection seems clear.  
Organizations should also consider changing marketing and communication strategies as 
well. Continuing medical education (CME), for example, provides ample opportunity for 
corruption or the appearance of corruption. Companies might want to adopt some of their strict 
rules around CMEs in the United States.203 Infant formula firms are doing the same things after 
                                                 
196 Ben Hirschler, How GlaxoSmithKline missed red flags in China, Reuters (July, 19, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/us-gsk-china-redflags-idUSBRE96I0L420130719, (quoting former PwC 
partner saying “[t]ravel agencies are used like ATMs in China to distribute out illegal payments. Any company that 
does not have their internal audit department all over travel agency spending is negligent.”).  
197 See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, IBM Pays $10 Million Over Alleged Bribes in China, S Korea, WALL ST . J. BLOGS 
(Mar. 18, 2011, 2:01 PM EST), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/03/18/ibm-pays-10-million-over-
alleged-bribes-in-china-korea/. 
198 See, e.g., Benjamin Shobert and Damjan DeNobel, Compliance After China’s Healthcare Bribery Scandals, 
CHINA BUS. REV. (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/compliance-after-chinas-healthcare-
bribery-scandals/, (“…much of the questionable behavior that the GSK scandal has exposed is a symptom of sales 
organizations under extreme strain to generate sales.”). 
199 Glaxo Smith Kine Website, http://www.gsk-china.com/asp/News/client/newconten/12182013124946.htm. 
200 Adam Jourdan, China Arrests Former Shanghai Health  Deputy. UK Reuters (December 19, 2013), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/uk-china-corruption-idUKBRE9BI0BF20131219. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. (“company said the measures were not directly related to its Chinese problems and were rather part of a 
broad effort to improve transparency.”). 
203 Hirschler, How GlaxoSmithKline missed red flags in China , (“In the United States and western Europe, such 
CME funding for doctors is now tightly controlled. But there is little oversight in emerging markets .”). 
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their marketing practices came under scrutiny.204Other companies are taking note. A quarter of 
U.S. companies surveyed in recent American Chamber of Commerce survey said that they had 
made changes to business practices or incentives as a result of the GSK scandal.205 The best 
companies work to ensure that compliance violations do not occur, but they also plan for a 
problem. 
B. Preparing for Chinese Enforcement 
GSK had a program had more compliance officers in China than any other country except the 
U.S.206 They did twenty audits per year in china.207 And they did an extensive investigation 
earlier in the year.208 Corporations need a contingency plan. This should be the case in Chinese 
operations.  
Companies and their Chinese-based employees need to know what to do in the event of an 
investigation. They need to plan for Chinese authorities to conduct investigations and raids.209 
Under the FCPA, companies are encouraged to self-report. Chinese laws apparently encourage 
voluntary disclosure and confession.210 There is vigorous debate about the kind of circumstances 
in which companies should self-report to the DOJ.  A company facing a potential issue would 
have to consider whether they would go to Chinese authorities with a confession. 
                                                 
204 Jourdan, China Milk Powder Crackdown is Tough Medicine for Doctor. 
205 China Business Report 2013-2014, American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, http://www.amcham-
shanghai.org/ftpuploadfiles/Website/CBR/2013-2014-China-Business-Report.pdf. 
206 Hirschler, How GlaxoSmithKline missed red flags in China . 
207 Id. 
208 Id.  
209 For a list of suggestions of how to handle raids by Chinese law enforcement, see Dan Harris, How to Handle 
a Chinese Government Raid. Very Carefully. CHINA LAW BLOG (Sep. 16, 2013), 
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/09/how-to-handle-a-chinese-government-raid-very-carefully.html. 
210 Interpretations on Several Issues Concerning Application of Law for Handling Criminal Cases of Bribe 
Offering (Promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. & Sup. People’s Procuratorate, Dec. 31, 2012 effective Jan. 1, 2013) 
art. 12 (China) . 
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Finally, international companies need to plan for their employees’ safety and well-being.211 
The possibility of length detentions and forced confessions mean that companies need to have 
safeguards to protect executives and other workers that might be targeted in an investigation. The 
increased focus on and enforcement of Chinese laws should make companies wary of continuing 
to be driven solely by FCPA concerns. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 International companies will continue to be drawn to China. While many companies 
recognize that Chinese operations are at risk for bribery, they still focus on FCPA-related 
concerns. Though the FCPA will continue to be a source of anxiety, responsible corporate 
officers are remiss if they are not paying close attention and making changes when necessary, to 
account for developments around Chinese laws.  FCPA compliance is not enough. International 
companies should be more concerned with China’s domestic anti-bribery laws—and not just 
because they might trigger or impact parallel FCPA investigations.  
Chinese bribery laws matter and international companies ignore those laws at their peril. 
Every executive and compliance officer should know that Chinese laws are broader in certain 
ways than the FCPA. Certain due diligence practices might conflict with some Chinese laws. 
Penalties, particularly for individuals, are high. Enforcement is likely to continue. Companies 
should take steps now to incorporate Chinese laws and enforcement into their own corporate 
strategies. Chinese laws are growing up. 
Appendix A: Compliance Gap Chart 
                                                 
211 See generally Part II.C.1. 
